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ABSTRACT
In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues against the possibility of a
private language. This argument has semantic implications for how we come to understand the
meaning behind our use of mental terms. Namely, that use determines meaning prior to
signification. However, an interesting part about Wittgenstein’s private language argument is
what it tells us about epistemic privacy. This paper seeks to establish Wittgenstein’s private
language argument in a framework which deals primarily with how we come to understand the
use behind our mental terms. Once we come to understand the use behind our mental terms, we
can come to understand how we come to have knowledge of mental states. The implications for
epistemic privacy are twofold. The first, is that other minds are necessary when it comes to selfknowledge of mental occurrences. The second, is that mental occurrences are an integral part of
conscious experience. Together, these two implications provide an epistemic framework which
depicts the mind as something which depends at least in part on other people. Since knowledge
of mental occurrences is both dependent on the existence of mental occurrences themselves and
the existence of others, minds are not epistemically private.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I build on Wittgenstein’s private language argument in order to present a view of
the mind which is not wholly epistemically private. In order to do so, I begin with a summary of
referential theories of meaning and how those theories result in an acceptance of metaphysical
dualism when it comes to establishing meaning behind mental language. I further argue that
metaphysical dualism combined with referential theories of language create two fundamental
philosophical problems when it comes to theory of mind. The first, is the possibility of a private
language and the second, is the problem of explaining the existence of other minds. In the second
section of this paper, I use Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following to challenge the possibility
of a private language and in doing so, challenge the assumption that mental states are private
phenomena. This sets the stage for the third section, which seeks to provide a semantic solution
to how we come to understand the meaning of our mental language without private language.
The fourth section builds on the semantic solution in order to provide an epistemic solution to the
problem of other minds. It concludes that other minds are a necessary component to establishing
self-knowledge of mental states. Further, I also establish that phenomenal mental occurrences are
necessary when it comes to self-knowledge of mental states. Together, these two points
demonstrate that the mind is not wholly epistemically private. Finally, the final section deals
with two perceived objections to this conclusion.
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1. REFERENTIAL THEORY AND METAPHYSICAL DUALISM
At the start of the Investigations Wittgenstein presents a referential theory of meaning which
he quotes from Augustine of Hippo. He writes,

When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and
I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out.
This, however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language
that by means of facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the
tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils
from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words, which I
heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once I got my tongue
around these signs, I used them to express my wishes. (qtd. In Investigations §1)

For Augustine, when it comes to how we learn the meaning behind our use of language, what
matters is the connection between a word and the object which the word signifies.
‘Signification’, in this sense, means referring or denoting. A word signifies an object when it is
referring to an object. The word refers to an object since it stands in as a sign for that object.
Under a referential theory of meaning then, a word’s meaning is determined by the thing which it
refers to or signifies.
Although Wittgenstein quotes a referential theory of meaning from Augustine in the
Philosophical Investigations, he himself holds the same view in the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argues for a picture theory of meaning which
involves logical relations between atomic facts and sentences. For Wittgenstein, sentences
express thoughts, which in turn represent facts about the world. He writes, “We make to
ourselves pictures of facts” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 2.1), and continues, “The picture is a model
of reality” (2.12). A picture for Wittgenstein, is the representation of a fact which is expressed
through language. The sentence ‘the tree is green’ for instance, presents a picture of a green tree.
‘The tree is green’ works as a depiction of reality since it corresponds to a fact about reality.
2

Crucially, this is the case since, “The picture has the logical form of representation in common
with what it pictures” (2.2). Since the sentence, ‘the tree is green’ shares the same logical
structure as the fact which it refers to (a green tree), the sentence ‘the tree is green’ has its
meaning determined by referring to the fact.
This depiction of Wittgenstein’s picture theory is brief and far from complete. However,
what matters for our present purposes, is that Augustine and Wittgenstein’s referential theory of
meaning relies on signification. Signification dictates that the meaning of a word (or a sign) is
determined by what that word signifies. What that word signifies, is what that word refers to. As
Wittgenstein describes in the Investigations, “In this picture of language we find the roots of the
following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the
object for which the word stands” (Investigations §1). When it comes to determining meaning
under a referential theory, what matters is the connection between a language term and that
which the language term refers to. This may be an object, under a traditionally atomistic view
such as that which is attributed to Saint Augustine. Or it may be an atomic fact, which is seen in
Wittgenstein’s picture theory. Either way, the referential theory of meaning presents a picture of
language which relies heavily on the notion of signification in order to determine meaning.
When it comes to how we learn how language terms signify objects under a referential
theory of meaning, the primary method is ostension. Ostension, or the act of showing, involves
the act of referring to something. In the case of Augustine’s depiction of how we come to learn
language, we learn the use of a language term by pointing to the referent object. Once one is
shown the referent which a language term signifies, one understands the meaning behind the
term. Indeed, Wittgenstein writes, “An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s
pointing to the objects, directing the child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a
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word… this ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an associative connection
between word and thing” (§6). Through the act of ostension, one is shown what a language term
signifies. Since we come to understand how the word is associated with what it signifies, we
come to understand the meaning associated with the term.
We might illustrate this idea with a plain paper cup. Let us assume that I have never
encountered a paper cup before and so, I am quite surprised when one of my good friends shows
up with a strange object in his hand. Confused, I point to the object and enquire as to what it is.
My friend, following my lead, also points to the object and explains exactly what it is. ‘It’s a
paper cup’ he says. Through the act of ostension or pointing to the object which I had not
encountered, I have come to understand that the words ‘paper cup’ signify the papery cone which
lies in my friend’s hand. Since I now understand that the words ‘paper cup’ signify papery
cones, I understand the meaning behind the utterance of ‘paper cup’. Under an Augustinian view
of learning then, we come to understand the meaning behind words by coming to know what our
language terms signify. We come to understand signification, primarily through the act of
ostension, or showing.
For our purposes however, we are interested in how Augustine’s picture of language
dictates our use behind language terms which deal with mental occurrences. Mental terms, are
those terms in language which depict mental states. Following the work of David Chalmers in
The Conscious Mind, mental states are often depicted as being one of two different concepts.
The first, is mental states as psychological concepts. Chalmers writes, “This is the concept of
mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behaviour. A state is mental in this sense if it plays
the right sort of causal role in the production of behaviour” (Chalmers 11). A mental state is
psychological if it plays a causal role in explaining behaviour. For example, learning is often

4

seen as wholly explained through a psychological concept of mind, since we can explain learning
solely through causal changes in behaviour. One can be said to learn while playing chess for
instance, since one changes how they move the pieces as they play more games. Someone who is
learning how to play chess well, changes their play behaviour to avoid making the same mistakes
they made before. We can say they are learning then, solely through how they behave with the
pieces over time.
The second concept typically used to describe mental states deals with a phenomenological
aspect. Phenomenological, since this type of concept puts emphasis on the subjective experience
associated with a mental occurrence. As C.S. Peirce writes, “The initial great department of
philosophy is phenomenology whose task it is to make out what are the elements of appearance
that presents itself to us every hour and every minute whether we are pursuing earnest
investigations, or are undergoing the strangest vicissitudes of experience” (Peirce,
“Phenomenology” 147). Phenomenological consciousness, in the Peircean sense, is reality
filtered through experience. As conscious beings, we cannot help but view the world through an
experiential frame of reference. Thus, our mental language, such as the term ‘pain’, is necessarily
tied to how we represent the world through the senses. Phenomenological mental terms then,
depict sensations.
My use of the word ‘sensations’ here, is being used in a broad sense which attempts to
portray phenomena that involve a quality of feeling. A quality of feeling is important since it
captures what makes us conscious of mental states. Chalmers writes, “a mental state is
conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can
say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel – an associated quality of
experience” (Chalmers 4). Mental states under the phenomenological concept of mind
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necessarily are associated with experiential sensations, or quality of feeling. To be in a particular
mental state under the phenomenal concept, is to feel a certain way while one is experiencing
that state. When we look at a colour like yellow for instance, we experience a visual sensation
that we associate with viewing that colour. For the purposes of this paper, we will be primarily
concerned with the phenomenological concept of mental states, and thus, with how our mental
terms are associated with sensations.
Under an Augustinian view of meaning, mental terms gain their meaning by referring to
mental states. The term ‘pain’ for instance, gains its meaning by referring to a sensation of pain.
Additionally, we learn how our mental terms refer to mental occurrences through ostension. G.E.
Moore, through his discussion of yellow, gives us a picture of ostension when it comes to visual
sensations. For Moore, yellow is a simple natural property. Thus, we cannot define yellow
through any form of complex explanation. He writes, “We may try to define it, by describing its
physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in
order that we may perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those lightvibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow” (Moore, Principia §10). Moore’s
example shows that color sensations are not the type of property which can be explained without
attributing a quality of feeling to it. The only way to define yellow, is to know what it is to
experience the perceptual sensation of the colour. This is a quality of feeling. It feels like
something to experience yellow. Thus, ‘yellow’ can be expressed as a mental term. Thus, under
a referential theory of meaning, we can only come to understand the term ‘yellow’ when we
come to associate it with the sensation of viewing yellow.
What the Augustinian referential theory of meaning leads to then, is that mental terms refer
to mental happenings or states, and subsequently substance. For Augustine, certain behaviours
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demonstrate the existence of phenomenological mental states. When one expresses pain
behaviour, such as crying, this behaviour is influenced by an inner sensation of pain. In
Augustine’s words, behaviours point to “the affectations of the soul” (qtd. In Investigations §1).
This relation between behaviour and mental occurrence sets up a distinct ontology between the
publicly observable body and the privately experienced mind. As Gilbert Ryle writes in The
Concept of Mind, “The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like
this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a
body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind”
(Ryle 1). ‘The official doctrine’ or substance dualism, is the belief that every person is
composed of a publicly observable, physical body and a private non-physical mind. The mind
influences the body which in turn displays behaviour. Since it is assumed that the mind acts on
the body, these public behaviours demonstrate the existence of an inner mind.
Substance dualism is supported with a great deal of common sense. It seems that when I feel
and think, these occurrences are private phenomena. Only I can truly know what I am thinking
and feeling. On the other hand, I am aware that my behaviour is constantly available to the
scrutiny of others. My bodily actions are on public display. We might appeal once again to G.E.
Moore, who in his discussion of common-sense writes, “We all, I think, commonly assume, in
this way, that our acts of consciousness take place, at any moment, in the place in which our
bodies are at the moment” (Moore, Problems 7). Here Moore highlights another essential feature
involved in being a metaphysical dualist. Namely, that the mind is located in the same place as
the physical body. I cannot, as Moore highlights, get on a train and leave my mind behind. (7)
Additionally, the mind is essential when it comes to the life of the body. The difference between
myself and chairs for instance, is that I am in possession of conscious experience and chairs are
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not. (8) Together the mind and body work to form a single person.
Given metaphysical dualism and the referential theory of meaning, we come to establish the
reality of a private language when it comes to mental terms. A private language in this sense, is a
language which can only be understood by its inventor. This is the case since anyone only has
direct access to their own thoughts and sensations. Since the use of mental terms have their
meaning determined by referring to those thoughts and sensations, only I can know what I mean
when I utter mental language, such as ‘pain’. Thus, my use of mental language is a private
phenomenon. Further, although I seem to be certain of the existence of other minds, I cannot, by
our epistemological standards come to know their mental states. We then reach two essential
problems which come about through the referential theory of meaning joined with metaphysical
dualism. The first, is the seeming existence of a private language. The second, is explaining how
we come to know other minds.
A typical metaphysical dualist response to these problems is presented by Augustine. Since
behaviours gain their meaning from mental states they point to mental occurrences. Further,
since others exhibit behaviours that are analogous to our own, we can be confident in coming to
know both that mental occurrences exist in others, and that those behaviours come with the same
meaning. Thus, by appealing to analogous modes of behaviour, the metaphysical dualist looks to
dodge both the reality of private language and the problem of explaining other minds.
However, as Gilbert Ryle notes in his work, this analogical argument falls short. He writes,
“one person has no direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another. He cannot
do better than make problematic inferences from the observed behaviour of the other person’s
body to the states of mind which, by analogy from his own conduct, he supposes to be signalized
by that behaviour” (Ryle 4). The analogical solution dodges the problem with fallacious
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reasoning. If the happenings of my inner mind are epistemically private, the only thing I can be
justified in knowing is my own private language. Since mental terms point to occult mental
realms, all I can describe for certain when I utter a sentence such as ‘the banana is yellow’ is a
private meaning determined by the experience of my own mental state. Thus, the utterance has
no empirically observable meaning which can be justified. Finally, since all one has access to is
my publicly observable behaviour, all one can say for certain, is that I exhibit a certain type of
behaviour. There is no way to explain that my behaviour is evidence of conscious experience. In
order to remedy these problems, we must show that language is not a private phenomenon.
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2.– DISPROVING THE POSSIBIITY OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE
Wittgenstein, in his critique of the possibility of a private language, begins by targeting
various methods for establishing meaning found in traditional referential theories of meaning.
The first method, although not explicitly highlighted by Wittgenstein, can be found in Plato’s
Euthyphro. In a discussion between Socrates and Euthyphro on the nature of piety, Socrates bids
Euthyphro to tell him the meaning of ‘piety’. Socrates remarks, “Bear in mind then that I did not
bid you to tell me one or two of the pious actions but that form itself which makes all pious
actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious
through one form” (Plato 6d8-10) and continues, “Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I
may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that
kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not” (6e3-5). To understand what ‘piety’ means, Socrates
requires Euthyphro to present him with knowledge of the form, or essence of piety itself. Once
knowledge of the form is obtained, the form is used as a model to dictate all future applications
of the term ‘piety’. If an action is pious then it will display the essential characteristics of all
pious actions. On the contrary, if an action is not pious, it will lack the essential characteristics
of pious actions. The form in this case, is an objective idea which terms will refer to in order to
establish correct future use, and thus, meaning.
Wittgenstein is skeptical that relying on an objective idea as a referent will suffice for
establishing meaning. When it comes to essences, Plato’s method of division involves taking
various examples of a thing and pointing to essential characteristics. We may look at an oak
leaf, maple leaf and elm leaf for instance, and come to an agreement on a shared characteristic
common to all types of tree leaves. Yet Wittgenstein challenges, “what does the picture of a leaf
look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but rather ‘what is common to all shapes
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of leaf?’” (Wittgenstein, Investigations §73). His remark challenges the notion that there is a
specific form which we can point to in order to define what a leaf is shaped like. The shapes of
leaves differ so radically, it is impossible to find a common characteristic which is shared by all
leaves. If we come up empty when asked what the common form of a set of things is, such as the
form of a tree leaf, it is not the case that members of that set are determined by that form. If
meaning is determined by an objective idea which we can point to, we ought to be able to point
to it.
Taking another approach, John Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
suggests that general meaning derives from subjective ideas. Although Locke is also not
highlighted by Wittgenstein specifically, his theory is helpful to establish a referential theory
which uses subjective experience as a referent for establishing meaning. Locke writes of
experiencing objects, “Such precise, naked appearances in the mind . . . the understanding lays
up (with names commonly annexed to them) as standards to rank real existences into sorts, as
they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly” (Locke, Essay, II, XI, 9).
Under this view, the meaning of general terms such as ‘dog’, ‘triangle’ and ‘yellow’ correspond
to abstracted ideas. These abstracted ideas are gained through the subjective experience of
objects. When we view yellow objects such as a bananas, cars, or flowers for instance, we
abstract the idea of yellow from the common experience of yellow. The idea is then used as a
standard to dictate all future cases of applying the word ‘yellow’. We know the correct
application of ‘yellow’ if it matches up with the idea of yellow. Notice, that Locke’s theory of
meaning is not unlike that of Moore’s reliance on ostension when it comes to knowing simple
natural properties. In order to know ‘yellow’ we refer to the phenomenal perception or idea of
yellow.
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However, Wittgenstein is also skeptical that subjective ideas can serve as a referent for
establishing meaning. In order to challenge referential theories such as Locke’s, he asks us to
imagine a picture of a triangular prism before our minds. Under Locke’s theory of meaning, if I
hear someone utter the word ‘cube’, I know the meaning of the word since it brings about the
idea of a cube. So, if I hear the word ‘cube’ yet have the picture of a triangular prism before my
mind, I can easily say that ‘cube’ is used incorrectly by pointing to the idea of the prism. ‘Cube’
in this case, does not match up to the idea. Yet, Wittgenstein asks, “In what way can this picture
fit or fail to fit a use of the word ‘cube’? – Perhaps you say… I point to a triangular prism… say
it is a cube… then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture. – But doesn’t it fit?” (Wittgenstein,
Investigations §139). Imagine that upon hearing the word ‘cube’ you conjure up a picture of a
cube in your mind. This picture most likely corresponds with Fig. 1. Now imagine that you are
looking at the imagine of Fig. 1 tilted like Fig. 2. Already, our grasp of whether the image is a
cube may change. In Fig. 3, which is a top-down view of Fig. 2, we are hard pressed to admit
that the image presented is a cube. Instead, it could be interpreted as a triangular prism. This is
Wittgenstein’s point. There is nothing about the image itself which determines the correct use for
all future applications of the word ‘cube’. Subjective ideas, without an understanding of their
proper application are ambiguous.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

What these theories have in common is that they rely on a standard, or a norm for
12

determining the correct, or incorrect usage of a term. In the case of Plato, the norm presents itself
as an objective idea. In the case of Locke, the norm presents itself as a subjective idea. Indeed,
referential theories of meaning rely on establishing a norm, or rule for determining meaning.
Wittgenstein articulates this prior to the Investigations in his Cambridge lectures between 1932
and 1935. He suggests, “The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by
the feeling that attaches to the words. … Two words have the same meaning if they have the
same rules for their use. … The meaning changes when one of its rules changes” (Lectures §2).
Under this view, the correct use of a word involves following a rule. Once we know the rule for
a word’s use, we can determine all future uses of that word by following the rule.
Wittgenstein also summarizes this stance in the Investigations. He writes, “Here I’d like to
say first of all: your idea was that this meaning the order had in its own way already taken all
those steps: that in meaning it, your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you
physically arrived at this or that one… it seemed as if they were in some unique way
predetermined” (Investigations §188) and continues, “How the formula is meant determines
which steps are to be taken” (§190). The meaning of a word is pre-determined by the correct or
incorrect usage of that term in all future cases. In this sense, meaning relies on coming to know a
rule required for the proper use of a word. Once we know the rule, we can act in accordance with
that rule to use language meaningfully.
Although Wittgenstein has already established some skepticism in his critique of objective
and subjective ideas, in order to disprove the possibility of a private language, he must show that
meaning cannot rely on pre-determining norms. A good way to test a theory which relies on
rules, is to use it to explain how we apply mathematical formula to certain mathematical
problems. A mathematical formula functions as a rule which dictates how we ought to apply our
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mathematical language terms. Following the work of Saul A. Kripke, and an example given to
us by Wittgenstein, we can hypothesize that I understand the meaning behind addition since I
know the rule required to use it. Kripke writes, “By means of my external symbolic
representation and my internal mental representation, I ‘grasp’ the rule for addition. One point is
crucial to my ‘grasp’ of this rule. Although I myself have computed only finitely many sums in
the past, the rule determines my answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have never
previously encountered” (Kripke 7). If we think of a mathematical sentence such as ‘2+2 = 4’,
we might assume that the meaning behind this sentence comes in the form of a rule which
determines the process of my mental calculation. We can express this rule as the formula n+2.
Since I have completed this kind of mathematical sentence before and understand how to
properly apply the formula n+2 to such a sentence, I grasp the meaning behind addition. Indeed,
upon meeting a slightly different sentence with much the same symbols, the correct application
of n+2 snaps into my mind. ‘3+2 = 5’ for instance, is determined to be a correct application of
the rule, while ‘3+2 = 4’ is determined to be incorrect.
The nagging question, however, is determining how I know the correct application of the rule
itself. If my understanding comes in knowing a rule for proper use, what gives me knowledge of
that rule in the first place? Wittgenstein summarizes, “how does an explanation help me to
understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so
I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!’ – As though an explanation, as it were
hung in the air unless supported by another one” (Wittgenstein, Investigations §87). In order to
understand addition, I require knowledge of the rule for addition. Yet in order to understand that
rule, I require a meta-rule to explain it and so on. Like words, rules require knowledge of how to
properly apply them. If words and rules both require the same competence when it comes to
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their proper application, it does not make sense to explain that ability by evoking the other.
Indeed, if we try to explain the use of words by pointing to rules, we verge on infinite regress.
However, we may buckle down and insist that regardless of how we have come to know the
rule, we do apply n+2 to various mathematical sentences in order to understand their correct or
incorrect use. Wittgenstein once again challenges our assumption by offering up a thought
experiment involving a student performing addition. He writes, “we get the pupil to continue
one series (say ‘+2’) beyond 1000 – and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him,
‘Look what you are doing!’ – He doesn’t understand. We say, ‘you should have added two: look
how you began the series!’ – He answers, ‘Yes, isn’t this right? I thought that was how I had to
do it’” (§185). In the thought experiment, Wittgenstein’s student correctly uses the rule ‘n+2’ as
he reaches 1000. He writes, 996, 998, 1000. Yet, as he proceeds past 1000 he begins to write
1004, 1008, and 1012. When confronted on this, the student simply replies that he was following
the correct directions. The student has interpreted the rule, ‘n+2 until you reach 1000 then begin
n+4’. Any number of correct instances before the student’s deviation is thus consistent with
more than one rule. Yet, there is nothing which dictates which rule the student is following.
Kripke presents the problem as a skeptical argument against the assumption that we reference
a particular rule which determines all future steps when we perform addition. He writes, “The
sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am now misinterpreting my own previous usage. By
‘plus’, he says, I always meant quus” (Kripke 9). When performing addition, we assume we are
following plus, yet there is nothing dictating that I am following that rule. Instead, I might be
following a deviation from plus. I may instead be following quus. What Kripke and
Wittgenstein highlight, is the notion of a bent-rule, or a rule which deviates from its initial
meaning. Since a rule must determine meaning in all future cases, we expect it to be the case
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that Wittgenstein’s student would continue the infinite chain of addition with the formula ‘n+2’.
We assume in this instance, the student is following the rule ‘plus’. Yet, the skeptics reply is that
there is nothing dictating that the student is following the rule ‘n+2’. Instead, He could be
following a bent rule, such as ‘n+2 until 1000, then n+4’, or following Kripke’s lead, a variation
of plus, such as quus. Wittgenstein and Kripke’s skeptical point is that there is no fact about the
student which determines he is following one rule rather than another..
We then hit a paradox if we assume that meaning is determined by a rule. Wittgenstein
writes, “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every
course of action can be made out to accord with a rule” (Wittgenstein, Investigations §201).
Notice here, that the problem of rule-following is no different than attempting to establish
meaning based on Locke’s notion of ideas. There is nothing about an idea which determines the
proper application of a term like ‘cube’ in all future cases, since ‘cube’ might be made to accord
with the idea of a triangular prism. There is thus nothing about the idea which determines the
proper use of ‘cube’. The same applies with rules. There is nothing intrinsic about a rule which
determines its proper use over an infinite number of cases, since future cases might be made to
accord with a bent-rule.
When it comes to theory of mind, Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox creates substantial
problems for metaphysical dualism. Remember, metaphysical dualism assumes that the meaning
of mental terms relies on the signification of mental states. My sensation of pain for instance,
determines my use of the term ‘pain’ for all future cases. Yet Wittgenstein writes, “Let’s imagine
the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end
I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the
sensation (§258). Much like the mathematical pupil attempts to follow ‘n+2’ by making a chain
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of calculations, the diarist seeks to demonstrate the meaning behind ‘S’ by signifying the
sensation S. He does this by writing ‘S’ in his diary whenever he has the occurrence of S. Yet,
Wittgenstein’s diarist hits the same paradox as his pupil. What tells the diarist he is actually
recording the sensation S? Perhaps, a skeptic might push, the sensation you are actually
experiencing when you write ‘S’ is Q.
Hence, there is nothing about the sensation S, which determines all the possible applications
of ‘S’ in future cases. As Kripke suggests, “The important problem for Wittgenstein is that my
present mental state does not appear to determine what I ought to do in the future. Although I
may feel (now) that something is in my head corresponding to the word ‘plus’ mandates a
determinate response to any new pair of arguments, in fact nothing in my head does so” (Kripke
56). If a mental state determines the meaning of our mental terms, then pointing to that mental
state will determine the incorrect or correct application of the term in future cases. Yet, nothing
about a present mental state determines the correct application of the mental term. If the mental
state itself does not determine proper use, then it cannot be the case that mental terms gain their
meanings by referring to mental states.
The takeaway from Wittgenstein’s semantic skepticism then, is that meaning behind the use
of mental terms, if we accept a referential theory of meaning, is ambiguous without a prior
understanding of how to properly apply mental language. Wittgenstein writes, “When one says
‘he gave a name to his sensation’, one forgets that much must be prepared in the language for
mere naming to make sense” (Wittgenstein, Investigations §257), to highlight this point. The
Augustinian assumption that our mental terms refer to mental occurrences comes under fire since
Wittgenstein has shown that signification is not a reliable source of meaning. His rule-following
paradox demonstrates that mental terms must gain their meaning prior to signification.
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Additionally, Wittgenstein’s diarist example challenges the idea that we can have private
understanding of our mental states.
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3. –WITTGENSTEIN’S SEMANTIC SOLUTION
Wittgenstein’s semantic solution to the rule-following paradox builds into a positive
epistemic theory which gives us a different perspective on how to approach both the possibility
of private language, and the problem of other minds. His solution consists in two main moves.
The first, is to establish that our use of language is determined through training. The second, is
to establish that our use then determines meaning. Once one is trained on the proper use of terms,
they largely understand the meaning behind those terms. Notice that this is the opposite of
signification. Signification refers to something which determines the proper use of a term. Under
signification, the meaning of a term determines the correct or incorrect use, while under
Wittgenstein’s view, use determines meaning.
To begin, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a signpost in the place of a word. He writes,
“What has the expression of a rule—say a signpost—got to do with my actions? What sort of
connection obtains here? - Well, this one for example: I have been trained to react in a particular
way to this sign, and now I do so react to it” (§198). We can imagine coming upon a signpost
which points us in a certain direction when we come to a fork in a road. What about this signpost
determines my next actions? Well, under a theory of meaning which relies on signification, one
looks to the signpost and the signpost determines what I ought to do. Yet, how do I know how to
interpret the signpost? Wittgenstein’s paradox calls into question that I have an understanding
how to act by only the signpost itself. Perhaps for instance, I mistake the tail of the signpost as
being the correct way to turn when I come to the fork and misinterpret its meaning. Thus, I need
to know how to apply the signpost prior to understanding how to properly use it. Wittgenstein’s
answer is training.
Wittgenstein’s mathematical pupil is accompanied by a mathematical tutor. When the pupil
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adds ‘+2’ in the correct manner, the teacher praises the pupil’s work. Yet, when the pupil hits
1000 and reveals he is following a bent-rule, the teacher balks at his incorrect use of ‘+2’. Thus,
the pupil comes to understand the correct use of the formula ‘+2’ when he changes his action and
begins to apply it correctly again. Wittgenstein suggests that we come to understand how to
properly apply the signpost, and thus, how to properly apply words in the same way. We come to
understand the proper use of language through training.
The immediate objection presented by an interlocutor is the following. Wittgenstein writes,
“But with this you have only pointed out a causal connection; only explained how it has come
about that we now go by the signpost; not what following the sign really consists in” (§198). If
my action is merely dictated with how I am trained when I approach the signpost, then the
meaning of the sign has no actual connection with how I respond. Thus, I may be acting in
accord with what the sign says, but I may not be following what it says. If this is the case, then
training does not qualify as an explanation of understanding the meaning of the sign itself. I may
instead be acting as an automaton, without any kind of understanding.
Wittgenstein’s reply suggests that a trained- response to the signpost only follows when
there is an established custom, or regularity behind doing what the sign says. He replies, “Not so;
I have further indicated that a person goes by the signpost only in so far as there is an established
usage, a custom.” (§198). Wittgenstein’s point here emphasises the need for a regularity when it
comes to understanding proper usage. When his mathematical pupil is corrected by the teacher,
the pupil begins to once again, properly apply ‘+2’ to a series of examples over 1000. He writes,
1002, 1004, 1006, and so on. We might ask here, what criterion is needed to state that the pupil
understands the proper use of ‘+2’? The interlocutor, wary of the possibility of writing out the
correct chain of ‘+2’ without actually coming to understand the proper use of ‘+2’, points out
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that training only explains how the pupil came to causally write out a series of examples.
Wittgenstein’s response sets a criterion for demonstrating proper use by adding a further caveat
to the process of training. The pupil understands the correct use of ‘+2’ only when he
demonstrates that he follows how ‘+2’ is customarily used in a language game. The language
game being in this instance, mathematics.
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on regularity transitions into the second move of his theory.
Namely, that use determines meaning. He writes, “What is the criterion for how the formula is
meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, were taught to use it.” (§190) In
establishing regular use, one establishes the meaning behind our terms. We understand how to
respond to the signpost for instance, because when one regularly uses a signpost, they know the
pointed end points in the correct direction. We know the pointed end points in the correct
direction, since we have been trained on the regular use of the signpost. Thus, the regular way in
which we use our terms determines the meaning behind those terms. This makes the interlocutors
worry irrelevant when it comes to understanding since regular use establishes a criterion. If one
uses language how it is customarily used, they demonstrate that they largely understand the
meaning behind their use of the terms.
It is important to consider how Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning changes how we come to
understand meaning from previous theories which rely on signification prior to use. Kripke
writes, “Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based, not on truth conditions, but on
assertability conditions or justification conditions. Under what circumstances are we allowed to
make a given assertion?” (Kripke 74). Unlike, theories which rely on referring to something
which determines the truth-value behind our use of language, Wittgenstein asks what conditions
need be present in order to determine meaning. For Wittgenstein, these conditions present
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themselves in customary practices. Thus, there is no determined truth-value for the application of
language in an infinite number of cases. Instead, the meaning behind our terms ebb and flow
within the customary usage of our language.
When it comes to mental terms then, Wittgenstein looks to how we ordinarily use them to
determine meaning. What is discovered, is that the mental state itself has little relevance when
we use it in everyday discourse if we assume meaning comes from a referential theory of
meaning. In order to demonstrate this, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a thought experiment
involving boxes and beetles. He writes, “Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it
which we call a ‘beetle’. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle” (Wittgenstein, Investigations §293). Let us
follow Wittgenstein’s advice and imagine a conversation which stems from such a scenario. I
stand holding an unopened box, an interlocutor approaches and inquires as to what is inside. The
conversation might go something like the following:
Me: “I have a beetle in my box”
Interlocutor: “What is a beetle?”
Me: “The thing in my box.”
Interlocutor: “Well, what is the thing in your box?”
Me: “A beetle”
If the word ‘beetle’, derives its meaning from the thing in its box, we reach our semantic paradox
created through private language. The interlocutor cannot know what I mean by the word
‘beetle’ since the interlocutor has no access to the thing in the box. Thus, Wittgenstein writes, “if
we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the
object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” (§293). The same problem appears, as we have
already discussed, with mental terms. Imagine the following conversation where we replace
‘box’ with ‘head’ and ‘beetle’ with ‘pain’. It goes like this:
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Me: “I have a pain in my head”
Interlocutor: “What is a pain”?
Me: “The thing in my head”
Interlocutor: “Well, what is the thing in your head”?
Me: “A pain”
Once again, if we assume meaning comes from signification, pain drops out of the picture as
being relevant. Yet this cannot be how we come to understand mental terms for two main
reasons. The first, is that being in a mental state, such as pain, seems undeniably relevant to
what we mean behind our utterance of pain. The second, is that others do seem to understand
what we mean by pain perfectly well.
In order to solve the problem of private language when it comes to theory of mind, we ought
to apply Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning to mental terms. The first step is to look at our first
uses. Wittgenstein writes, “Words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of
sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him
and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior”
(§244). Here, Wittgenstein suggests primitive behaviours function as an expression of mental
states. A child, when in pain begins to cry. However, as the child develops an adult begins to
train them to use different exclamations. The child, for instance, may be taught to change a
painful wail to an ‘ouch’. Here we establish Wittgenstein’s first requirement for meaning.
Namely, training determines proper use.
An important thing to notice in Wittgenstein’s account is the relevancy of mental states when
it comes to establishing meaning. Mental states are expressed with primitive behaviour which is
then trained into regular uses. This is not to say that behaviour signifies a particular mental state.
Instead, behaviour is a primitive form of regularity. When a child is in pain, a child regularly
expresses that pain through crying. Thus, the mental state does not determine meaning, but it
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certainly is relevant to establishing use. Since the mental state is relevant to determining use, it is
relevant to establishing meaning. If this is the case, it is not use alone which determines
meaning. The experience of the mental state itself contributes to establishing meaning by being
that which can be expressed.
Indeed, as we express ourselves through language, customary uses are trained and those uses
then establish the meaning behind our terms. The child, who has learned the word ‘ouch’ to
correctly express pain, successfully tells his parents that he is hurt. His parents, having taught the
child to say ‘ouch’ as a regular expression of pain, understands that the child is in pain. Crying
after all, might serve as an expression of many different mental states, such as fatigue or
frustration. In this sense, the term ‘ouch’ serves to refine exactly what the child means. Use then,
establishes the meaning behind the term.
Thus, Wittgenstein explains how we come to understand the meaning behind the use of our
mental terms without relying on signification. Since he does not rely on signification, he dodges
the problem of private language which is assumed in theories of mind such as substance dualism.
We come to understand the meaning behind mental terms by coming to know their regular uses.
These regular uses are a result of training various primitive expressions. Under this view, we do
not require direct access to the mental states of others in order to successfully communicate the
meaning behind our mental language.
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4. - WITTGENSTEIN’S EPISTEMIC SOLUTION
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning also builds into a solution to the problem of explaining
knowledge of other minds. There are two aspects to the epistemological question of how we
come to have knowledge of minds. Following the work of Paul M. Churchland, “the first
problem is called the problem of other minds: How does one determine whether something other
than oneself… is really a thinking, feeling, conscious being… the second problem is called the
problem of self-consciousness: How is it that any conscious being has immediate and privileged
knowledge of its own sensations?” (Churchland 111). Using Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning,
we can come to potential solutions for both problems.
In order to solve the first problem we must first tackle the second. Namely, how is it that we
have privileged knowledge of our own sensations? Wittgenstein writes, “Other people cannot be
said to learn of my sensation only from my behaviour – for I cannot be said to learn of them. I
have them. This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I
am in pain; but not to say it about myself” (Wittgenstein, Investigations 246). When we
experience pain, we cannot doubt that we are in pain. When I stub my toe, only I experience the
sensation which goes along with that action. Indeed, someone else may doubt that I am in pain
at all after my toe-stubbing incident. Thus, only I have privileged access to the quality of feeling
which comes about after stubbing my toe.
Yet, it is important to pause here and consider what it means to have self-knowledge of that
particular sensation. Namely, the feeling of pain I get after stubbing my toe. The interpretation
of the word ‘know’ is a point which Wittgenstein continuously highlights throughout the
Investigations. In particular, he is concerned with two main interpretations of the word when it
comes to mental sensations. He writes, “The grammar of the word ‘know’ is evidently closely
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related to the grammar of the words ‘can’, ‘is able to’. But also closely related to that of the
word ‘understand’, (To have mastered a technique)” (§150). Wittgenstein’s distinction here,
points to two different aspects of self-consciousness. The first, is the privileged access to mental
sensations. When I stub my toe, pain shoots throughout my body. Under this interpretation, I
am able to experience a quality of feeling. I cannot doubt that this occurs, while others can. The
other aspect is how I come to understand what this pain means.
The importance of this distinction when it comes to self-consciousness is that simply having
the occurrence of a sensation is not sufficient for having self-knowledge of that sensation.
Wittgenstein writes:
In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain;
another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are
using the word ‘know’ as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people
very often know if I’m in pain. – Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it
myself! – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it
supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain. (§246)

Wittgenstein’s point here is that all privileged access to qualities of sensation tells us, is that we
experience a particular sensation. When one states, ‘only I can know whether I am really in
pain’, according to Wittgenstein, is that a particular sensation of pain is occurring in that
moment. In this sense, ‘know’ is being used under the first interpretation. That one is able to
experience pain. Yet, as Wittgenstein urges us to ask over and over again, what needs to be
established in language in order to name that sensation in the first place?
The crux of the problem is Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. Under the rule-following
paradox, we cannot come to understand a sensation by experience alone. We might bring up
Moore’s example of yellow to illustrate this problem. Yellow, for Moore, is a natural, simple
quality which can only be known when ostensibly brought to our attention. We only come to
know the experience of yellow by associating it as a simple property which is commonly seen in
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objects. The color of a banana for instance, is what we mean by ‘yellow’. Yet, how only using
the sensation of yellow, does one come to understand that the sensation one is experiencing
means ‘yellow'? Could the sensation one is experiencing, under a skeptical inquiry, turn out to
be the color Qellow? Like the pupil who follows the wrong rule in his mathematical calculations,
or the diarist who follows the wrong sensation in his attempt to record ‘S’, the yellow observer
cannot understand the sensation of yellow simply by having that sensation. There is nothing
about the sensation which tells him how to apply the term ‘yellow’ to that sensation in all future
cases.
We thus come to see the importance of others in establishing self-knowledge. We cannot be
certain of our experiences without having an established criterion for justifying what those
particular sensations mean. All we have the privilege to say without a framework of meaning
when it comes to mental sensations, is that we are having sensations. In order to understand those
sensations, as Wittgenstein writes in On Certainty, “It needs to be shewn that no mistake was
possible. Giving the assurance ‘I know’ doesn’t suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that
I can’t be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a
mistake about that” (Certainty §15). To simply have mental sensations occur is not sufficient to
know those sensations. In order to know a particular sensation is occurring, one must understand
what that sensation means. Under Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning, meaning comes from
regular use which in turn, comes from training. Thus, it is necessary that others are involved
when it comes to understanding mental sensations.
We might look at it this way. A newborn has sensations which cause it to exhibit certain
primitive behaviours. It may, for instance, experience hunger and cry out. Yet the newborn does
not understand that it is hungry, nor does it understand that crying is an act of communicating
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hunger. Indeed, the parents also have a hard time understanding what the newborns behaviour
means. The newborn could be experiencing any number of things, such as hunger, pain, heat or
light sensitivity. Only through regular interaction, in which the parents both feed and speak to
the child does it come to associate the sensation of hunger with the proper meaning. On the same
token, the parents learn to differentiate a certain expression with a certain meaning. Eventually,
as the child grows, it learns to associate the word ‘hungry’ with the desire to eat.
It is clear then, that self-consciousness is deeply intertwined with, and necessarily reliant on
other minds. How we come to know other minds is necessarily dependent on how we come to
understand our regular use of expressions. How we come to understand our regular use of
expressions necessarily involves other minds. We might put it as Wittgenstein does in the
Investigations. He writes, “In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain” (Investigations §253). Since self-knowledge
necessarily relies on a test of understanding when it comes to objective criterion, pain is not
solely an individual experience. It is true that upon stubbing a toe, one feels a private quality.
Yet, the sensation as a whole is forged both with a quality of feeling, and an understanding of
what it means. Thus, the experience of pain when stubbing a toe is not wholly epistemically
private. We know that others experience pain since we come to have self-knowledge of pain
through others.
If this is the case, Wittgenstein paints a picture of the mind which functions differently from
the Augustinian view. The first thing to note, is that privileged access to one’s own mental states
and thoughts does not reign supreme. Since self-consciousness is dependent on others, the
problem of other minds seems to dissipate. Indeed, the question flips. It no longer asks, how can
we explain the existence of other minds? But instead asks, how can the existence of other minds
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explain our own? The mind shifts from its status as a wholly individual phenomenon to that
which is shaped and structured through communal relations. C.S. Peirce, in his discussion of
personhood, presents a picture which describes this relation. He states, “The man’s circle of
society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood) is a sort of loosely
compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism”
(Peirce, “Pragmatism” 338). The problem of other minds through this framework seems to be a
nonsensical problem. If our individual minds are shaped through the relations involved with
other minds, it is necessary that other minds exist.
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5. - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Before we accept this solution to the problem of other minds however, two significant
objections must be addressed. The first is addressing the problem of secrets or lying. In other
words, the ability to hide meaning from others. Although this seems like a problem for our
epistemological theory, it merely depicts another form of meaning which requires the existence
of a regularity. The objection goes something like this. I can privately withhold meaning, or
present false meaning to others through keeping secrets or telling a lie. If this is the case, only I
have privileged and direct access to the truth behind what I mean. Since meaning can be private
in these cases, it shows that minds are wholly individually private.
In order to tackle this objection, we ought to make another distinction between weak and
strong privacy. Weak privacy, involves the technical trick of withholding, or presenting false
meaning. In this case, only you have direct access to what you mean behind that particular use of
language. Yet, this does not in principle prevent anyone from understanding what you mean. If
one can in principle understand what you mean when you withhold or present false information,
you are not expressing anything which is private in the strong sense. Only the strong sense of
privacy is sufficient for establishing a private language. Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind
describes this distinction. He writes, “The technical trick of conducting our thinking in auditory
word-images, instead of in spoken words, does indeed secure secrecy for our thinking, since the
auditory imaginings of one person are not seen or heard by another… But this secrecy is not the
secrecy ascribed to the postulated episodes of the ghostly shadow world” (Ryle 23). Here, Ryle
presents a picture of secrecy which involves the technical trick of hiding meaning from others.
For instance, one thinks a sentence instead of expressing it. In not expressing a sentence, one
hides what they mean.
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However, this kind of technical trick is not unlike using a pair of shutters to block one from
seeing inside a room. Ryle further presents the metaphor, “In the case of all the specifically
head-senses, either we are endowed with a natural set of shutters or we can easily provide an
artificial set” (Ryle 26). Imagine you are having a conversation with someone in a room. As
you speak, you walk through a door into another room and close it behind you. The other person
can no longer hear what you are saying, yet this does not make it so they can in principle not
understand you. Now, view the door of the room as your own lips. Instead of telling the other
person what you mean, you simply close your mouth and keep that information a secret. Only
you know what you were going to express, yet this does not mean that the person cannot in
principle, have known it as well. Secrets then, merely hide meaning from others. They do not
create private meaning in the strong sense.
The act of lying, much like the act of holding a secret, involves the technical trick of
presenting false meaning. Yet, in order to understand how to perform a lie, one must understand
what it means to lie in the first place. Wittgenstein writes, “Are we perhaps over-hasty in our
assumption that the smile of a baby is not a pretence? – And on what experience is our
assumption based? (Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one)”
(Wittgenstein, Investigations §249). We might once again ask, what needs to be in place in
language in order to determine that something is a lie? The answer is explained through
Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning. To lie to someone in your speech community you must use
words in the way you both understand them. It is what you say with those shared meanings that
is intentionally misleading.
Yet, it is important to pause here and discuss our use of the word ‘intention’ when it comes to
telling a lie. We might once again bring up Wittgenstein’s pupil. What is the difference between
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the pupil making a mistake in the series as he provides his answers to ‘+2’ and the pupil lying
about his calculations in the series? Well, the first involves an unintentional act which is
corrected by the teacher. This is part of the training of coming to understand how to apply ‘+2’.
The second involves an intentional act in which the student already must be trained in the proper
use behind ‘+2’. The student then purposely goes against the regular use as a technical trick.
The important point, however, is that the student is not demonstrating anything which cannot in
principle be understood by the teacher. The teacher, upon inspecting the further work of the
pupil, may actually determine that the pupil is lying based on his performance. What this shows,
is that in order to lie at all one must already be versed in proper use, and thus, understand
meaning.
The first objection to our epistemological solution then, ironically works to support the notion
that other minds are necessary to determining self-consciousness. This is precisely because weak
privacy depends upon the inability to have strong privacy. What makes a secret a secret, or a lie a
lie, depends on a regularity of what it means to keep a secret or tell a lie. Thus, although secrets
and lies do demonstrate that one can have a weak sense of privacy when it comes to meaning,
they are not sufficient to prove the notion of strong privacy.
The second objection comes in the form of functionalist accounts of mind. Functionalism
defines mental states not by the composition of the states themselves, but by the function that
they perform. Churchland writes, “According to functionalism, the essential defining feature of
any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to (1) environmental effects on the
body, (2) other types of mental states, and (3) bodily behaviour” (Churchland 63). A popular
theory of mind, functionalism captures important features of Wittgenstein’s epistemological and
semantic theories. Functionalism considers the importance of third-party influence, expressive
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behaviours and relations between mental states. However, functionalism poses a threat precisely
since the importance of the mental-states themselves falls out of the picture. Churchland writes,
“What is important for mentality, argues the functionalist, is the not the matter of which the
creature is made, but the causal structure of the internal activities which that matter sustains”
(64), to illustrate this point. If all that matters is the causal structure behind mental states, the
composition of mental states themselves fall out of relevancy.
Take the following zombie scenario posed by David Chalmers. He writes, “consider the
logical possibility of a zombie: someone or something physically identical to me (or any other
conscious being), but lacking conscious experience all together. At the global level, we can
consider the logical possibility of a zombie world: a world physically identical to ours, but in
which there are no conscious experiences at all” (Chalmers 94). We can imagine a world that is
physically identical to our own in every way. In this physically identical world, we all behave in
exactly the same way. However, we can imagine that in our imaginary world, there is no such
thing as conscious experience. All the actions of those in that world, are merely causal
implications of physical laws. Under the functionalist account of mind, which primarily is
concerned with causal relations, there is no significant difference between these two worlds
when it comes to how minds function. If there is no difference, functionalism fails to explain
away the problem of other minds, since it does not explain the existence of other forms of
consciousness. It only explains the causal relations prevalent in how minds function.
Thus, functionalism poses a problem for Wittgenstein’s epistemological solution as we have
set it up in this paper. If we can explain minds only using causal relations, there is no need to
assume that mental states actually occur. If there is no need to assume that mental states actually
occur, there is no reason to conclude the existence of other minds. Perhaps, a skeptic might
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challenge, the world is full of zombies who simply act in causally identical ways. Thus, in order
to arrive at our epistemological solution, we must demonstrate that mental states are better
described as a phenomenological concept.
In his article, “What is it like to be a Bat?” Thomas Nagel provides a thought experiment
which challenges that reductionist accounts of minds can adequately explain mental
phenomenon. We know for instance, how a bat behaves. In order to hunt and maneuver through
the air, a bat uses high pitched shrieks to navigate. Equipped with intricate webbing, a bat knows
how to fly in complete darkness. Further, as dawn approaches, the bat hangs upside down in
order to sleep. Nagel asks us to imagine what it is like to be that bat. However, he writes, “In so
far as I can Imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to
behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to
be a bat” (Nagel 439). Under a functionalist theory of mind, we may be able to explain certain
mental states which accompany the behaviour of a bat. Upon nearing an owl for instance, a bat
may shriek in panic and fly the opposite way. Causally, we can postulate the bat experiences a
form of fear. Yet this does not tell us what it is like for a bat to feel fear. The quality of feeling
of fear is important to what it means to be a conscious bat. This is not to deny that mental states
do not have functional characterisations. It only denies that functional characterisations capture
all that a mental a state is. The subjective character of experience, or what it is like to be
conscious, is an integral part of how minds work.
Further, Frank Jackson in his article, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, presents another thought
experiment which captures subjective experience from a human perspective. We can imagine an
individual named Mary, who is educated solely in a black and white room. Mary reads black
and white books, and watches black and white lectures. In this way, Mary learns everything she
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can know about the physical world. Yet, Jackson writes, “It seems, however, that Mary does not
know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color
television, she will learn what it is like to see something red” (Jackson 291). Confined to the
black-and white room, Mary can learn all the causally relevant facts about the colour red. She
may for instance, learn that red is a certain frequency of light-waves, which holds a certain
location on a colour spectrum. She may learn that red is the colour of red things, such as a red
house, or a red rose. However, what she is missing in her education of causal relations, is the
subjective experience associated with seeing red. Like Moore’s idea of yellow, the subjective
experience of the color red is a simple natural quality, which cannot be reduced to causal
explanations such as light-wave frequency.
What these thought experiments show is that reductionist theories of mind such as
functionalism miss an integral part of mind. Ignoring or denying the relevance of subjective
experience dismisses an important aspect of conscious experience. When it comes to
understanding self-consciousness then, not only are other minds necessary, but the occurrence of
subjective experience is an unavoidable aspect of consciousness. In this sense, both
interpretations of the use of ‘know’ are an integral part of Wittgenstein’s epistemological
solution. One must have the occurrence of a mental sensation in order to understand what
occurs. On the other hand, one must understand what occurs in order to have knowledge of a
mental occurrence. Thus, one cannot simply eliminate or ignore the relevancy of subjective
experience.
One of the biggest misconceptions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind is to categorize him
as a functionalist or behaviourist. Yet, this reduces his epistemological views to his semantic
views. He writes,
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“But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain
behaviour without pain.” – Admit it? What greater difference could there be? – “And yet you
again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” - Not at all. It’s not a
Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the
same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the
grammar which tends to force itself on us here. (Wittgenstein, Investigations §304)

Wittgenstein does not deny the relevance or the existence of mental states. Indeed, he expresses
that there is a huge difference between pain behaviour without the occurrence of pain and pain
behaviour with the occurrence. He instead wishes to claim that under a theory of meaning which
relies on signification, a nothing serves just as well as a something when it comes to explaining
the meaning behind our mental terms. As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s shift in semantic theory
brings back the relevancy of mental states by linking use to primitive expressions.
If this is the case, the functionalist objection to the epistemological solution is not sufficient.
Since the subjective occurrence of mental states is necessary to understanding those occurrences,
we can conclude that those who operate in the proper regularities established in our forms of life
also have subjective experience. As Wittgenstein writes, “You learned the concept ‘pain’ in
learning language” (§384). We feel pain. As we feel pain we express certain primitive
behaviours. Through training, we learn to associate these behaviours with regular use. Regular
use determines the meaning of those behaviours which forms our concept of pain. Subjective
experience within an objective framework work together to create our mental concepts. This is a
strong claim, yet the paradox of other minds falls away once we come to establish that knowing
mental occurrences relies both on having them, and on coming to understand them.
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CONCLUSION
Wittgenstein’s theory of mind then, is heavily reliant on his semantic conclusion of the
inability to have a private language. Once he demonstrates that our use of mental terms
establishes meaning prior to signification, he can call into question that minds are epistemically
private phenomenon. This comes from an interpretation of what it means to have knowledge of
both other minds and self-consciousness. We cannot, as he demonstrates with the private
language argument, come to have self-knowledge of our own mental occurrences without an
understanding of what those mental occurrences mean. An understanding of what those mental
occurrences mean necessarily relies on the existence of other minds. On the other hand, the
quality of feeling which comes from the mental occurrences themselves is also an integral part to
what it means to have conscious experience. Thus, knowledge of mental states relies heavily
both on the existence of other minds and the occurrence of mental phenomenon. What is arrived
at, is a picture of mind which is not epistemically private. Instead, as Peirce demonstrates in his
notion of personhood, the mind may be better viewed as that which is not wholly individual, but
that which is shaped by communal relations.
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